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In September 2013, leptospirosis was diagnosed in 
two Spanish travellers returning from Thailand. The 
first case walked in floodwater in the Phi Phi Islands in 
pouring rain: 20 days later he presented with fever and 
acute hepatitis. The second presented with fever and 
renal failure 17 days after visiting the islands. These 
cases remind clinicians to consider leptospirosis in 
febrile patients with a history of contact with flood or 
fresh water while travelling to tropical countries.
Of the over 1,400 species of infectious organisms 
known to be pathogenic to humans, 60% are zoonotic, 
i.e. transmissible from animals to humans [1]. We there-
fore continuously face the threat of newly emerging 
pathogens with a major health impact. In the last dec-
ade, viral zoonoses have resulted in numerous human 
cases of infection with e.g. influenza A viruses, Ebola 
virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus, and Middle-East 
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Wild aquatic birds and bats are thought to be the reservoir for many virus families in nature
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Blue: influenza viruses, red: paramyxoviruses, green: coronaviruses. Dotted arrow: The presence of influenza viruses in both species 
suggests that transmission from birds to bats, or the other way around, may have occurred in the past.
As humans do not frequently come into contact with bats and wild birds, they are more likely to contract zoonotic viruses via intermediate 
hosts such as domestic birds and mammals. Such zoonotic events almost always result in isolated cases of human infection, as indicated 
under ‘zoonosis’. Rarely, upon mutation or reassortment, these zoonotic viruses adapt to the new human host, acquire human-to-human 
transmissibility, and may start a pandemic (as depicted under ‘pandemic’). In the last century alone, four human influenza pandemics have 
occurred. Pandemics of paramyxoviruses and coronaviruses are even more rare, yet numerous viruses of animal origin that belong to these 
families are also endemic in humans
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respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus. While these 
zoonotic viruses often caused severe disease and 
deaths in humans, they generally did not represent 
global health threats as the viruses lacked the ability 
of sustained human-to-human transmission. However, 
some of these viruses might adapt to replicate in and 
spread between humans, to cause pandemics. This is 
true in particular for respiratory viruses associated with 
recent zoonotic outbreaks that belong to families that 
also contain viruses that are endemic in humans and 
thus have been shown to possess pandemic potential 
in the past (Figure). Monitoring and predicting which of 
the various zoonotic viruses have the potential to cross 
the species barrier and emerge in humans globally has 
become a major topic in infectious disease research.
Wildlife can host an enormous diversity of viruses, 
which generally do not cause severe disease in these 
reservoir hosts. Bats have been recognised as reser-
voir hosts of viruses of the Filoviridae, Paramyxoviridae, 
and Coronaviridae families [2,3], while wild birds har-
bour the greatest diversity of influenza A viruses. 
Recently, close relatives of avian influenza A virus 
were also found in bats [4]. Occasionally, viruses are 
transmitted from their reservoir hosts to other animal 
species, intermediate hosts, from which the viruses 
may subsequently be more efficiently transmitted 
to humans, e.g. as a consequence of more frequent 
contact. Unfortunately, very little is known about the 
genetic and phenotypic viral and host traits that facili-
tate interspecies transmission. In addition, knowledge 
on the mechanisms by which these zoonotic viruses 
may subsequently adapt to efficient replication and 
spread in humans is lacking. Recently, progress has 
been made towards understanding the genetic and 
phenotypic requirements of avian influenza viruses to 
become transmissible in ferrets [5-9].
Influenza A viruses are among the most intensively 
studied viruses when it comes to host range and trans-
mission. The reason is that influenza A virus zoonoses 
and pandemics occur relatively frequently compared 
with other virus families. Influenza A viruses have 
been isolated from many hosts, but wild birds in the 
orders Anseriformes (ducks, geese and swans) and 
Charadriiformes (gulls, terns and waders) as well as 
bats are thought to form the virus reservoirs in nature 
(Figure). At least 18 subtypes of the influenza virus sur-
face glycoprotein haemagglutinin (HA or H) and 11 sub-
types of neuraminidase (NA or N) have been detected 
in the reservoirs [4]. In the last century, only influenza 
A viruses of subtypes H1N1 (in 1918 and 2009), H2N2 
(1957), and H3N2 (1968) have spilled over from wild 
birds to poultry or pigs and subsequently triggered a 
pandemic, with or without the requirement for prior 
host adaptation or reassortment (i.e. genetic mixing 
of gene segments). However, avian influenza viruses 
circulating in poultry (e.g. of subtypes H5, H6, H7, H9, 
and H10) have occasionally crossed the species barrier 
to infect humans, raising concerns of a new pandemic 
threat. The continuing circulation of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses in poultry in Asia 
and the Middle East has resulted in hundreds of mil-
lions of poultry deaths. Cross-species transmission 
events of H5N1 virus have been reported for several 
species of wild birds and mammals, including humans 
(Figure). However, sustained human-to-human trans-
mission has not yet been described.
A study that appears in the current issue of 
Eurosurveillance by Chea and colleagues investigated 
two cases of human influenza A(H5N1) virus infection 
in Cambodia [10]. After the post-mortem diagnosis of 
influenza A(H5N1) virus infection in a mother and her 
child, the authors performed a follow-up study of indi-
viduals who had been in contact with the two cases. 
The mother and child were assumed to have been 
infected from a common poultry source. Although 
there were no poultry samples available for retrospec-
tive laboratory confirmation of H5N1 virus infection, 
poultry in and around the household had started to die 
before disease onset of the cases. Respiratory speci-
mens from all contact cases tested negative by RT-PCR 
for influenza A(H5N1) virus, and no H5N1 antibodies 
were detected in follow-up sera of contacts. Based on 
this extensive epidemiological investigation, there was 
no evidence of human-to-human transmission between 
the cases or their contacts. The authors conclude that 
the two cases were most probably exposed to a com-
mon source of contaminated environment. 
Similar clinical, virological, and epidemiological inves-
tigations were performed by Xiao et al. [11] and Hu et 
al. [12], but for laboratory-confirmed cases of infec-
tion with influenza A(H7N9) virus. Since the emergence 
of the H7N9 virus in February 2013, only one possi-
ble human-to-human transmission event had been 
described [13]. Here, Xiao and colleagues describe the 
probable transmission of H7N9 virus from a father to 
his five year-old child after he worked on a wet market 
contaminated with H7N9 virus [11]. Disease onset in the 
child was 10 days later than in the father, and virus was 
detected in the child several days later as well. The 
child reportedly did not have contact with poultry in 
the 12 days before onset of the disease. Investigations 
of 40 close contacts did not result in the detection 
of additional cases of infection. Hu et al. describe a 
similar case of human-to-human transmission from a 
woman who also contracted influenza A(H7N9) virus 
at a contaminated wet market and probably transmit-
ted the virus to her husband [12]. The man reportedly 
never visited wet markets and had not purchased or 
eaten poultry in the two weeks before the onset of his 
illness. Onset of disease and detection of the virus in 
the man occurred approximately one week later than in 
his wife. Again, 27 close contacts were followed up, but 
they all turned out to be H7N9-negative. These studies 
thus present two probable cases of human-to-human 
transmission of H7N9 virus. In both studies, high 
nucleotide sequence identity between the viruses from 
the linked patients was in agreement with this assump-
tion. In the first study, the virus could further be linked 
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genetically to an environmental sample [11]. Although 
the H7N9 virus has been shown to have some ability 
of airborne transmission (via aerosol and respiratory 
droplets) between ferrets [14-18], the human cases 
are most likely to have occurred through direct contact 
transmission between family members.
Qi et al. describe the potential origin and genetic diver-
sity of the most recently identified zoonotic influenza 
virus subtype, H10N8, which was detected in a patient 
that visited a poultry market a few days before onset 
of illness [19]. Phylogenetic analysis of the viruses iso-
lated from the patient and the poultry market showed 
that six genes had the same genetic origin, but the PB1 
and PB2 genes (that are part of the viral polymerase 
complex) were of a different origin. These two genes 
from the human and chicken virus may be derived from 
H9N2 chicken and H7 duck influenza viruses, respec-
tively. The genetic differences between the internal 
genes of the human and chicken viruses suggest that 
H10N8 viruses continue to undergo reassortment, as 
reported previously for H7N9 virus. The authors sug-
gest that the H10N8 viruses have become established 
in poultry and speculate that the diversity of the H10N8 
viruses may be much higher than reported so far.
Interestingly, the PB2 gene of the human H10N8 virus 
contained an E627K mutation, which is a well-known 
mammalian adaptation mutation associated with 
virulence and transmission of influenza viruses in 
mammals, and which was absent in the avian H10N8 
strain. This same mutation was also noted in a fifth 
paper on influenza virus zoonosis in this issue of 
Eurosurveillance by Wang et al. [20]. Based on analy-
ses of large numbers of full virus genome sequences, 
these authors propose an evolutionary history of H7N9 
viruses, involving continuous amino acid substitutions 
and reassortment events. According to the authors, 
reassortment events resulted in at least 26 genotypes. 
Additional host adaptation of H7N9 viruses resulted in 
the deletion of five amino acid residues from the NA 
stalk region and changes in the receptor binding site, 
resulting in increased affinity for human-type recep-
tors. Finally, the well-known mammalian adaptation 
mutations in the polymerase complex protein PB2 
were acquired, which may allow the viruses to repli-
cate more efficiently in the upper respiratory tract of 
mammalian hosts. The authors conclude that due to 
this host adaptation process, the pandemic potential 
of influenza A(H7N9) is higher than that of any other 
known avian influenza virus. However, it should be 
noted that the pandemic risk of influenza virus strains 
may not be equal to their zoonotic risk, and that dif-
ferent influenza virus subtypes or lineages may require 
different genetic or phenotypic changes to cause zoon-
oses and pandemics.
Recently, the United States Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention developed an inventory of amino acid 
substitutions in H5N1 viruses linked to critical phe-
notypic changes. It supports a molecular approach 
for surveillance and is useful for identifying genetic 
changes that may affect phenotypic traits of impor-
tance such as virulence, (mammalian) host adaptation, 
polymerase activity, airborne transmissibility etc. [21]. 
In geographical locations where viruses already have 
some of the critical mutations associated with mamma-
lian adaptation and transmission, intensified surveil-
lance is key for monitoring the emergence of viruses 
with potentially high impact. As previously described 
by Russell et al., deep sequencing of avian, other non-
human, and human virus samples, preferably collected 
at multiple time points, is necessary to better charac-
terise the likelihood of emergence of viruses with an 
increased public health risk [22]. Additional studies are 
also needed to better link the genetic changes in influ-
enza viruses of various subtypes with the phenotypic 
changes that affect within-host fitness and between-
host transmissibility. Furthermore, additional experi-
ments are needed to determine the effect of mutations 
that may affect transmission of newly emerging influ-
enza virus subtypes in humans [22]. Because many 
substitutions may be functionally equivalent to those 
described previously, and because the effect of such 
substitutions may be dependent on the virus back-
bone, sequence-based virus surveillance alone may be 
misleading. Therefore, surveillance studies and epide-
miological investigations may be improved further by 
including virus phenotyping assays, using relatively 
simple methods as described previously for airborne 
transmissible H5N1 [5].
The five publications in the current issue of 
Eurosurveillance on the potential transmissibility and 
evolution of influenza viruses highlight the impact of 
these zoonotic viruses on global health. Surprisingly 
little is known about the routes and mechanisms of 
virus transmission. As a consequence of these knowl-
edge gaps, key questions in public health such as 
“Can newly emerging viruses acquire the ability of 
human-to-human transmission to trigger a pandemic?” 
remain unanswered. Increased knowledge is impor-
tant to predict risks and to adapt pharmaceutical and 
non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies to prevent 
outbreaks or pandemics. Currently, we appear to rely 
on humans as sentinels for virus outbreaks in ani-
mals and often apply a reactive rather than pro-active 
approach to limit the impact of emerging virus infec-
tions. Implementation of the One Health concept as an 
approach to overcome some of the difficulties, includ-
ing efforts to improve laboratory capacity and surveil-
lance systems in humans and animals, may limit the 
impact of zoonotic and pandemic threats in the future.
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